Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 62

Issue 4

Article 5

1974

Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System
by Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert
Weschler
George W. Liebmann
Frank, Bernstein, Conoway and Goldman

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Liebmann, George W. (1974) "Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System by Paul M.
Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Weschler," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 62: Iss. 4,
Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol62/iss4/5

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Special Book Review
HART AND WEcHLsr's, Tim FEDERAL CouRTs AND TEE FEDERAL SYsrEm

(2d ed. .1973) by PaulM. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro
and HerbertWechsler. Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, Inc.,
1973.
Certainly it is the height of presumption to undertake a review of
this new edition of a work which has come to be regarded by courts
and practitioners, as well as by the academic fraternity, as the most
penetrating delineation and description of problems of federal junsdiction and of the allocation of power between state and national
courts. The justification for such a review is that this work has
hitherto been a national resource: it has been the work from which
a genieration of law students has gamed appreciation of the workings
of the federal system as it relates to the business of courts and it has
been the swiftest and surest guide for judges and practitioners in the
same sphere. To the extent that judicial discussions of problems of
jurisdiction retain any intellectual coherence in an age of mindless
activism, both conservative and liberal, that coherence is in large
measure due to the disciplined consideration of jurisdictional problems
encouraged by this book.
The initial edition declared that "though this book was planned
and executed in the hope that it might be of use in practice as well as
in the schools, it is primarily a teaching book, designed to lay the basis
for an advanced course in public law."' Any appraisal of the second
edition must include an assessment of the extent to which it imparts
to students an appreciation of the fact that "the jurisdiction of courts
m a federal system is an aspect of the distribution of power between
the states and the federal government."2 Certainly the more recent
case books in this field, many of which are little more than handbooks
on how to "get into" federal court, are not calculated to. instill, m
the coming generation of lawyers, an appreciation of the proposition
of Mr. Justice Story, quoted by Professor Frankfurter in his introduction to the first modem case book on these problems, that "questions
of jurisdiction are questions of power.
" Yet, as the authors of the
first edition appropriately noted, "federal jurisdiction, as our subject
is usually called, would surely be a sterile topic were it not explored
"APrefaceto H. HAIT & H. WECHSLE,, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System at xii (1953) [hereinafter cited as HART & WEscmam (1st)].
2 Id. Preface at m.
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in this perspective. .. " The second edition, therefore, must meet
two tests: First, is its emphasis such as to impress upon a new generation of law students an appreciation of the workings and values of
federalism? Second, is its coverage of developments since 1953 in
sufficient depth to cause the work to retain its value to judges and
practitioners and its consequent influence on the development of the
law? The answer to both these questions must be generally affirmative.
The new work, however, unlike its predecessor, is a collaborative
effort in which "ultimately responsibility for various parts of the book
was divided among the four [editors]. . . ."3 In consequence, differing
chapters warrant differing appraisals which to be just must take note
of the authors' disclaimer that "[t]his volume is a second edition; it
does not purport to be a new book."4 Accordingly, the several chapters
will be considered in turn:
I
The revision of the chapter on the development of the federal
judicial system undertaken by Professor Bator makes few changes in
the earlier familiar text. The earlier discussion of the debates on the
ratification of the Constitution is retained verbatim and supplemented
by a listing without discussion of the recently published historical
literature on the subject. 5 One recently published work which might
usefully have been cited for its value to students and to practitioners
and judges is the summary description by Ms. Folsom of the available
primary and secondary sources dealing with the ratification debates
and of the appropriate methods of legal research into "the original
understanding". 6 It may be that a brief discussion of the much
mooted question of whether the debates of the federal convention
or the debates of the state ratifying conventions are entitled to greater
weight could have been included here. 7 The earlier summary of the
provisions of the FederalistPapers relating to the organization of the
federal judiciary is repeated verbatim. The discussion includes no
reference, however, to numbers 45 and 46 of the Federalistwith their
bearing on the anticipated contours of federal criminal jurisdiction;
nor does the specialized discussion of federal criminal jurisdiction
undertaken by Professor Wechsler in Chapter IX include any discussion of the original understanding of this subject. The subsequent
3 Id. Preface at

4Id.

xvii.

5H. HAnT &H. WECHsLER, The FederalCourts and the Federal System 21 n.
114 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECnSLE1].
6 G. FOLSOM, LEGISLATrIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF
L ws (1972) 89-107.
7Id. at 95-96.
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commentary on the growth of the judicial system again repeats without
change the work of the earlier edition, with the addition of a brief
reference to the reform of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction worked by
the Act of February 13, 1925.8 For some reason the supplementation
of the bibliographical notes does not contain any reference to Professor
Mason's accessible and readable biography of Chief Justice Taft which,
for students at least, is a useful road to appreciation of this statute.
The only other consequential change in the notes is the addition of
references to the three judge court provisions contained in recent civil
rights acts,9 and to the creation of the Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals,' ° together with reference to the recent changes in the
jurisdiction and organization of the courts of the District of Columbia.
There is no reference in this section to the recent creation of the Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation, in principle and practice
a not unimportant change."
The discussion of the business of the courts retains the previous
format, substituting tabulations of suits commenced in 1970 for the
previous tabulations for 1951. Comparative figures for fiscal 1960 are
also given. It would have been illuminating to obtain also for purposes
of comparison the figures for the earlier year, since that comparison
dramatizes the explosion in private federal question litigation 2 and
in bankruptcy cases.' 3 The detailed notes appropriately spotlight the
explosion of litigation in the antitrust, civil rights, and other fields.
A new provision is a comparative table of shifts in federal criminal
case loads. The text appropriately stresses that the earlier increases
in the federal criminal case load were produced in the prohibition
period, and in the war years by price control and rationing cases. The
text discussion does not spotlight the increased case load in the civil
rights, narcotics, robbery, and weapons and firearms area, which does
not yet present problems of the prohibition and wartime dimensions.' 4
On the other hand there has been a sharp decline in liquor tax prosecutions, and a more modest decline, resulting from shifts in federal
prosecution policy, for auto theft.
This section of the chapter contains new, but unfortunately inade8 See HART & WEcUsL.R
at 41.

9Id. at 46 n.65.
10 Id. at 49 n.94.
11 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (Supp. 1974).
12 From 8,653 cases in 1951 to 13,175 in 1960 and 34,846 in 1970.
13 From 32 535 cases in 1951 to 110,034 in 1960 and 194,399 in 1970.
14 Civil rights prosecutions increased from 8 in 1961 to 192 in 1970; narcotics
prosecutions from 1,524 in 1961 to 3,511 in 1970, not including an additional
3,268 petitions under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act; robbery prosecutions
from 479 in 1961 to 1,580 in 1970 and weapons and firearms prosecutions from
205 in 1961 to 1,547 in 1970.
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quate, treatment of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968.11 There
is no disclosure of the tenure of federal magistrates or the provisions
for their compensation. It declares in unfortunately misleading terms
that "in addition they are given jurisdiction to try 'minor offenses'
under 18 U.S.C. Section 3401," while failing to mention the fact that
the jurisdiction thus conferred is essentially elective with the defendant, since he retains the right to elect trial by a federal district
court. The elective nature of the criminal jurisdiction of United States
Magistrates is more adequately discussed by Professor Wechsler in
the chapter on Federal Criminal Jurisdiction."6 The constitutional
problems which lurk in any effort to remove jurisdiction to try federal
criminal offenses committed within the states (as distinct from the
District of Columbia and unorganized territories) to judges not possessing life tenure or irreducible compensation are, however, not discussed in this chapter nor, save in cursory form, later in the book.
Regrettably absent also is any discussion of whether the requirement
of independent judges with life tenure for all proceedings in which
the federal government seeks to deprive a citizen of his liberty is a
constitutional safeguard of significant proportions. Nor does the work
reach the question whether the "election" provided between trial by
magistrate and trial by judge is in fact a true election or whether
in fact, the right to trial by judge may be so burdened by court delays
and other collateral consequences as to be increasingly nugatory. It
is doubtful that the coming generation of practitioners and law students will be emboldened to raise such questions by the cursory discussion of the Federal Magistrates Act contained in this book. It is
true that the new magistrates are not appointed by the executive
but by federal judges. It was, however, arguably a purpose of the
constitutional provisions dealing with the federal judiciary to limit
the size and scope of the federal judicial establishment. 17
There is a brief analysis of the recent expansion in the work load
of the Court of Appeals (unfortunately unaccompanied by references
to recent pertinent literature)' 8 and a reference to the current expansion of the case load of the Supreme Court which is supplemented
15 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (Supp. 1974).
16HAnT & WECHSLER at 1290.

17 One may recall the remonstrance of the Declaration of Independence:
He has made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their
offices and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a
multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our
people,
and eat out their substance.
8
1

See,

e.g., Carrington,

Crowded Dockets in

the Court of Appeals: The

Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HAnv. L. RE~v. 542
(1969); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration,
42 TExAs L. Rxv. 949 (1964).
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by a more elaborate discussion in the eleventh chapter which is editedby Professor Shapiro. Finally, there is a note on the administration of
the federal courts similar to the note in the first edition. This discussion includes no reference to the source and limits of local rulemaking powers, an important subject in light of recent developments
concerning the right of jury trial in civil cases.19 The elaborate boiler
plate description of the various divisions of the Department of Justice
contained in the initial edition is omitted, which is certainly no loss.
II
The chapter on the case and controversy limitation is primarily
the work of Professor Mishkin. Unlike the first chapter it constitutes
a substantial rewriting and supplementation of the materials in the
first edition. The chapter commences with a discussion of advisory
opinions adapted from the earlier edition. A subtly ironic note
observes that "the speed with which the Supreme Court passed on
the constitutionality of the 18 year old voting provisions in Oregon v.
Mitchell" was analogous to the purposes sought to be served by advisory opinions; a shrewd insight. Certainly that case, in which large
and novel constitutional questions were decided by the court before
the normal process of public and professional debate had fairly begun
provides a striking illustration of the dangers of dilution of the case
and controversy requirement or of efforts to unduly expedite and
contract the process of constitutional adjudication. The default in
that case was especially regrettable in light of the similar failure
of the legislative process in most of its stages which, along with the
possibility of executive veto, were circumvented by recourse to legislative rider. The best comment on this episode remains that of one of
the new measure's proponents uttered in another context:
Our age is contentious and frenetic, inclined to distrust the force
of standards that one's adversaries may choose to ignore, inclined to
seize its own innings and impatiently mark up victories and defeats
day by day. And yet who can say that we may safely stake our
vision of the future on the accumulation of little triumphs of the
day, unless they are earned by what I have ventured to call
morality of the mind-by understanding, respect for the limitations
as well as the creative opportunities
of authority, and the even2°
handed application of principle.
The new edition repeats the useful and extended discussion of
opinions of the Attorney General as well as the previous discussion of
Marbury v. Madison. There is then a useful added discussion of the
19 See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
20p. FBEuN- , TrE SuPrEmE Cotmr oF m UNrrm

STATES

144 (1961).
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rhetoric in Cooper v. Aaron, referring to Supreme Court decisions and
the interpretation announced in them as "the supreme law of the land".
Certainly that the rhetoric of the court was in some measure extravagant is almost universally acknowledged. There is a useful collection
of the later writings on the decision, though not including Professor
Lusky's possibly relevant discussion.21 Certainly the expressions of
courts must be viewed as disciplined and conditioned by the facts of
the cases before them. To read a decision as thus confined where this
is done without disingenuous distinction certainly does not constitute
a defiance of "the supreme law of the land" in a nation whose legal
system is or purports to be a system of case law. It is doubtful, moreover, that those who would support a more expansive interpretation
of the binding authority of Supreme Court dicta in legitimately distinguishable cases are prepared to live with the consequences of such
a view of authority as applied to the discretion of district courts.
In the end, literal interpretation of the rhetoric of Cooper v. Aaron
must be rejected if one holds, as the authors of the second edition in
some measure do, that the courts are neither authorized nor competent
to engage in lawmaking ex nihilo. As Judge Learned Hand observed
in a different context, that of the limits on the federal injunction:
no court can make a decree which will bind any one but a party;
a court of equity is as much so limited as a court of law; it cannot
lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly itwords
its decree .... It'is not vested with sovereign powers to declare
conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over whom it
gets personal service, and who therefore can have their day in
court.... This isfar from being a formal distinction; itgoes deep
into the powers of a court of equity.... It is by ignoring such
procedural limitations that the injunction of a court of equity may
by slow steps be made to22realize the worst fears of those who are
jealous of its prerogative.
In the end extravagant expressions as to the authority of judicial
dicta are inconsistent with the maintenance of procedural due process,
process which, as Professor Hurst has pointed out, has as one of its
objects a sharpening of judicial appreciation of gains and costs. 23 Professor Mishkin's notes on Cooper v. Aaron, brief though they are,
adequately expose the problem to the new generation of law students.
The second portion of the second chapter deals with the problems
presented by executive revision of judicial decisions and the require2

Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law, 63 CoLum. L. REv.
116322(1963).
Aemite Mfg. Corp. v.Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930). See Schmitt v.
Lessard,
23 94 S.Ct. 713 (1974).
J. Hursr, LAw Am SocLkL PnocEss iN UiNrrn STATES HmSTORY 142 (1961).
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ment of adverse parties, in terms largely drawn from the first edition.
Regrettably, the section omits, though it refers to,2 4 the extended discussion of the issues presented by extra-judicial service by federal
judges contained in the first edition.25 It is not likely that appreciation
of the value of the separation of powers is going to be enhanced by this
not insignificant omission.
The chapter continues with a lengthy discussion of legislative revision of money judgments which refers to numerous cases and to
some of the literature. 26 The discussion of feigned and moot cases has
been significantly updated. Professor Mishkin has displayed a shrewd
eye for some of the more bizarre recent federal cases resulting from
the conduct or default of parties.2 7 The editor also shrewdly makes
note of the oft-cited opinion in the "case" of PennsylvaniaAssociation
for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,28 in which, after a new state
administration abandoned the defense of the case, a consent decree
was entered by the court granting virtually all the prayers of the
plaintiff.
The three judge court approved the settlement, Without passing on
the merits of the constitutional claims, but finding them sufficiently
cognizable to found federal question jurisdiction. The court held
that the state's change of position did not make the case nonjusticiable, and, on further motion, issued its injunction to enforce
the settlement agreement against the school district members of the
class29who had not participated directly in the original proceedings.
In this fashion state powers of legislative appropriation and executive
administration were transferred by consent of the state executive to
the federal judiciary, a surely bizarre proceeding, with the consequences for due process and rights of third parties spelled out by
Professor Mishkin. More remarkably still, the resulting "precedent"
has been enthusiastically cited by other courts and commentators. Nor
is this the only recent performance of this kind by the Attorney General
of Pennsylvania; the authors might have, but did not, cite the
failure of the same officer, the Pennsylvania Attorney General, to test
24
25

2

HART & WECHSLER at 88 n.1.
HART & WECHSLER (lst ed.) at 102 et seq.
6 See also A. VANDERBILT, THE DoaruNE OF TIm SEPARATIoN OF PowERS

99-104 (1963).
27 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Bootze Mfg. Co., 289 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.
Ind. 1968), where a collusive federal court replevin proceeding was instituted in
order to enlist the aid of United States marshals in transporting goods across a
picket line.
28 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
29 HAlR & WECHSLER at 107. Contrast Vermont v. New York, 94 S.Ct. 2248
(1974).
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a judgment against the State in the Supreme Court, which failure
resulted in a holding throwing the national law relating to prejudgment garnishment into a state of continuing confusion.30 This section
of the chapter might also have contained a reference to the recent
practice of some state attorneys general of filing briefs in the Supreme
Court contesting state powers to enact challenged legislation.31
The section of the chapter on mootness has been completely
updated and reflects a shift (as does the Supreme Court's work)
from private to public law cases. The section on declaratory judgments also has been rewritten though less extensively. As before,
little stress is given to the discretionary character of declaratory
judgments and of the factors properly influencing the exercise of
discretion. Nor is there much discussion of the case law bearing
on the exercise of discretion. The discussion of the use of declaratory
judgments in public litigation follows the earlier edition. There is
added to this discussion a note of only one sentence on preventive
relief in the criminal law:
Traditional doctrine was that "equity could not enjoin a prosecution" though it is a doctrine often honored in the breach. Should
there be any special reluctance to entertain preventive attacks on
criminal law? Cf. Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 1490 (1967).
Surely a more adequate treatment of this issue was called for. The
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Stefanelli v. Minard,3 2 characterizes
the doctrine not as "a doctrine often honored in the breach" but
rather as "summarizing centuries of weighty experience in AngloAmerican law" and as "impressively reinforced when not merely the
relations between coordinate courts but between coordinate political
authorities are at issue." It is set out in full text in the first edition 33
but receives only note reference in the second edition. As in the
first edition, another important limitation on federal declaratory judgments, the proposition of Skelly Oil Company v. Phillips Petroleum
Company,3 4 is neglected. Skelly Oil Company pointed out that:
Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal
courts but did not extend their jurisdiction. When concerned as
we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain
3
310 Swarb

v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 201 (1972).
Comment, An Attorney Generals Standing before the Supreme Court to
Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. Cmu. L. REV. 624 (1959), for
example, was not cited by the authors.
32324 U.S. 117 (1951).
33
HAr- & WECaSLER at 890.
34339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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litigation within the restricted area to which the Constitution and
Acts of Congress confine them, "jurisdiction" means the kinds of
issues which give right to entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction
in this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act.
It is true that the American Law Institute federal jurisdiction proposals dispense with this doctrine,3 5 but it is not the function of a
treatise to anticipate adoption of these proposals.
The discussion of standing questions is not enhanced by omission
in the new edition of the extended discussion of the several opinions
in the Joint Anti-Fascistcase 36 included in the first edition, particularly
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. Nor is the loss of this expression of the values underlying the standing doctrines remedied by
inclusion of more contemporary statements of similar views, for few
such are included, notwithstanding the availability, for example, of
Solicitor General Griswold's influential argument in Sierra Club v.
Morton,3 7 generously printed as an appendix to Justice Douglas'
dissenting opinion in that case. The somewhat general discussion of
standing assimilates standing under the Administrative Procedure
Act and standing in the absence of express statutory provision and
tends to confuse in the mind of the student the statutory and constitutional issues. This treatment is not surprising in light of the
authors' view that:
[Cllarity would be gained by viewing standing as involving problems of the nature and sufficiency of the litigant's concern with the
subject matter of the litigation, as distinguished from problems of
the justiciability-that is, the fitness for adjudication-of the legal
questions which he tenders for decision. More precisely stated, the
question of standing in this sense is the question whether the
litigant has a sufficient personal interest in getting the relief he
seeks, or is a sufficiently appropriate representative of other interested persons, to warrant giving him the relief, if he establishes the illegality alleged-and, by the same token, to warrant
recognizing him as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the
issue of illegality. So viewed, the question becomes inextricably
bound up with the whole law of rights and remedies, does it not?38
The difficulty is that, under this view, standing doctrine as an independent limitation on the power of courts disappears.3 9 For Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter, perhaps the principal architects of the
standing doctrines which constitute the subject matter of the chapter,
35

ALI Study § 1311(a).
36 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
37 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
3
8HAn & WECHSLLB at 156.

39 See also Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court: A FunctionalAnalysis, 86
Htuv. L. REv. 645 (1973).
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the doctrines had as their prime purpose maintenance of the separation of powers and the exclusion of classes of issues from judicial
consideration, not merely a marginal sharpening of advocacy or the
marginal particularization which results from the standing doctrine
suggested by the authors and some of the more recent Supreme Court
decisions. This view of standing need not be shared but should not
have been concealed. The later portions of the chapter do something
to remedy the defect. The quoted reference to the question whether
a litigant is "a sufficiently appropriate representative of other interested
persons" is also not an adequate substitute for more extended consideration of the standing questions presented by amended Rule 23.
The discussions of standing of voters, legislators, and competitors
do not significantly expand upon the discussion in the prior edition.
The discussion of standing in reapportionment cases in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, however, is caricatured
rather than summarized. The discussion of standing of legislators unaccountably omits the recent cases according them standing to assail or
40
defend reapportionment plans.
There is an extended and useful discussion of the doctrine allowing
statutes in the first amendment and related areas to be challenged on
their face. The stress is on the cases supporting such challenges.. The
principal limiting case cited is the 1963 decision in United States v.
National Dairy Products Corp.41 involving Section 3 of the RobinsonPatman Act. The discussion of the doctrine in Dandridge v. Williamson4 2 surely warranted at least note mention here.
The discussion of the "political question" doctrine does not explicitly discuss its purported limitation to questions within the purview
43
of the federal political branches, nor the early signs of its revival,
under the guise of justiciability if not under its original label, with
44
respect to state government questions in dicta in James v. Valtierra
and Gordon v. Lance,45 nor the applicability of the "coordinate federal
branch" limitation of the doctrine to state legislative and executive
action under joint federal and state programs. These questions have
been dramatically revived by the reemergence of the political question
doctrine in the recent Ohio National Guard case. 46
40

See, e.g., Silver v. Jordan, 341 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Cal. 1964), aff'd 881
U.S. 415 (1965).
41372 U.S. 29 (1963).
42397 U.S. 471 (1970).
43 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335-36 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
44402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971).
45
403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
4
0Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). The compatability of this decision
with Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), is an interesting subject
for discussion.
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III & IV
The third and fourth chapters by Professor Bator dealing with the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court comprehensively updates
the prior edition. Though quite relevant, the chapter does not include
the recent decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,47 nor the discussion
of parens patriae suits in District Courts in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co.,48 which receives only note reference, presumably because of its
appearance shortly before press time. The suggestion in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil that a state might be a suitable class representative in
consumer class action is not discussed or pursued, nor is the question
whether the state's entitlement to serve as such a representative is a
question of federal or state law.
9 includes a list of articles on the case,
The discussion of Chandler"
omitting the important article by Professor Kurland. 50
The discussion in the first edition relating to cases affecting
ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls has been drastically truncated to the detriment of the reference value of the work in this sphere.
The famous dialogue on the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts is retained essentially unchanged in the fourth
chapter with some footnote supplementation by Professor Bator.
The discussion of "Developments since the Dialogue' omits mention
of Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion in the Three Sisters case, 51
as well as the literature generated by the busing controversy. The following discussion of legislative courts appropriately commences with a
discussion of Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.5 2 The section goes on to inquire:
Do criminal prosecutions by the federal government present a
special case? (Recall the special mention of such cases in Article
III itself.) Note that Congress could presumably have such cases

tried in the state courts (at least if it chose not to create federal
trial courts); note, too, that the territorial courts exercised criminal
as well as civil jurisdiction. Nevertheless, legislation assigning

the trial of federal criminal cases, prosecuted within the United
States, to federal tribunals unprotected by the guarantees of Article
III could not be justified today, could it? Review, in this connection, the cases discussed in the Note on Court Martial Jurisdiction,
p. 372, supra. The language in some of them-notably Toth and

O'Callahan-clearly suggest that the Court will view with the highest ,disfavor any attempts to encroach on the jurisdiction of the

Article III courts over federal criminal cases.
47

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).

48405 U.S. 251 (1972).
49

v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
5 0 Chandler
Kurland, The Constitutionand the Tenure of FederalJudges, 36
REv. 5665 (1969).

U. CHm. L.

Volpe v. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
U.S. 530 (1962).

42 370
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The recent decision in Palmore v. United States53 makes clear that
this statement does not apply to the District of Columbia, but we may
assume that it does apply with respect to the fifty states, notwithstanding the generally loose language of the prevailing opinion.
V
The chapter on review of state court decisions by the Supreme
Court substantially supplements the earlier edition. The "Note on
Enforcement of the Mandate of the Supreme Court" takes cognizance
of the recent decision in In re Herndon 4 relating to contempt proceedings against state court judges acting in their nonjudicial capacity.
The new edition pertinently asks:
Should state judges in their judicial role be less amenable to a
contempt sanction in a case of clear defiance than sheriffs or other
officials? Does Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and the history that it
exemplifies have any bearing on the issue. See also the opinion of
Justice Baldwin in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. (Appendix) 614,
632 (U.S. 1840).
There perhaps should have been mention here of the important
pending case of Littleton v. Berbling,55 involving an attempt by federal
district judges to place state judges under an injunction requiring
specified future judicial conduct under pain of contempt penalties in
a proceeding under the civil rights acts. It is not easy to see how
such an order can be viewed as consistent with the rejection in 1789
and subsequently of proposals to subject state court judgments to
review in the inferior federal courts, or with the constitutional provisions relating to the oath of state judges, or, for that matter, with
the traditional limits on "criminal equity".
The section of the chapter on "The Relation Between State and
Federal Law" begins with the penetrating observation that:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies
a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the
legal systems of the states. This was plainly true in the beginning
when the federal legislative product (including the Constitution)
was extremely small. It is significantly true today, despite the
volume of congressional enactments, and even within areas where
Congress has been very active. Federal legislation, on the whole,
has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish
limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established
by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary
53
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). The quoted passage was
the subject of a supplemental brief filed by the appellant in Palmore.
54394 U.S. 399 (1969).
55 Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), Revd mem., 94 S.Ct.

894 (1974).
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for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way that
a state legislature acts against the background of the common law,
assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
That this is so was partially affirmed in Section 34 of the First
Judiciary Act, now 28 U.S.C. Section 1652, but an attentive
canvass of the total product of the Congress would establish its
surprising generality and force. Indeed, the strength of the conception of the central government as one of delegated, limited
authority is most significantly manifested on this mundane plane
of working, legislative practice..
This passage parenthetically makes exceptionally clear the extraordinary departure from American practice-a change of constitutional
dimensions if the view is taken that "the Constitution is something
more than the Supreme Court has to do with"5 6-represented by the
proposed federal criminal code which avowedly undertakes "to write
the new federal penal code very much like a state penal code."57
The ensuing discussions of state incorporation of federal law,
ambiguous state decisions, federal incorporation of state law and
federal protection of state-created rights fully update the treatment in
the prior edition. The same is true of the thoughtful treatment of the
"adequate state ground" question in federal habeas corpus. Similarly,
there is a careful treatment of the increasingly misused "no evidence"
doctrine of Thompson v. Louisville58 which has increasingly been
pressed into service as a substitute for substantive due process as a
means of dealing with statutes whose policy the court finds unjustifiable.
Assessment of such statutes under substantive constitutional restrictions at least has the merit of candor; the use of the Thompson doctrine or the more recent misuse of the doctrine of Tot v. United States 0
has the effect of obscuring issues rather than clarifying them. There is a thoughtful discussion of the extent to which dismissals
for want of a substantial federal question possess precedential value.
The. unappreciated distinction between cases within the obligatory
jurisdiction coming from state courts and cases within that jurisdiction
coming from federal courts is pointed out by a quotation from an
address by Chief Justice Warren:
It is only accurate to a degree to say that our jurisdiction in cases
on appeal is obligatory as distinguished from discretionary . ..
56 Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, 1970 Sup. CT.REv. 1, 3 (1970).

57

Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code at xxi (transmittal statement
of Edmond G. Brown, Chairman of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws).
58362 U.S. 199 (1960).
59 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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As regards appeals from state courts our jurisdiction is limited to
those cases which present substantial federal questions .... 60

This distinction of course does not excuse the recent mistreatment by
the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest6' of the prior summary affirmances in cases reaching the Supreme Court from three
judge federal courts as to which the Supreme Court's summary actions
clearly would seem to possess precedential value. Connoisseurs of
quotations out of context will also find it instructive to compare the
references to Stern and Gressman's treatise on Supreme Court practice
quoted in the Serrano opinion with the cited work itself. The authors
might have commented, though they did not, on the paradox presented
by the conduct of lower courts which on the one hand acclaim the
principle of Cooper v. Aaron, stretched to mean that the language
as well as holdings of Supreme Court opinions are the "supreme law
of the land" while on the other hand rejecting, when it is convenient
to do so, summary affirmances by the Supreme Court of cases within
its obligatory jurisdiction as sources of compelling authority. This is
a strange approach to precedent in a nation whose legal system is a
system of case law and whose constitution restricts the jurisdiction of
courts to "cases and controversies".
VI
The sixth chapter, primarily the work of Professor Shapiro, addresses the Erie doctrine and related matters. There is an extended
and useful discussion of the federal rulemaking power, discussion
given greater point by the recent controversy over the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Certainly the action recently taken by Congress constitutes a vindication of the viewpoint as to the appropriate scope of
the federal rulemaking power espoused by Justice Frankfurter in his
dissenting opinion in Sibbach,62 where he observed that:
a drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching the

sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy ought
not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules
for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the
civil side of the federal courts.
Had this admonition been heeded, the Court would have confined its
recent efforts to reform of the hearsay rule, and like matters, as
distinct from wholesale impairment of the common law privileges and
6 Qte in Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HAxv. L. REv. 20,
61487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
62 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).

51 (1954).
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disposition of much vexed matters concerning state secrets and the
like.
The new edition contains an interesting note on agreements not to
resort to the federal courts, a subject which has assumed potential
importance in light of the recent decision in Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Company.63 In that case, the Supreme Court held that clauses
in private agreements providing for forum selection "are prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by
the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances."6
It had been clear, at least since 1874, that clauses attempting
to oust the federal courts of diversity jurisdiction were invalid by
reason of what was then described as a common law doctrine that
"agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred
by law are illegal and void."6 5 The 1972 case, however, distinguishes
the early decision on the basis that it involved a situation "in which
a state's statutory requirement was viewed as imposing an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of the federal right of removal"
and accordingly restricted its applicability to purely contractual arrangements. It is safe to predict that this issue will be litigated in the
future as parties with particular interests in adherence to certain types
of state procedure or in avoiding the effect of the federal discovery
rules or restrictions on federal jurisdiction such as those of the NorrisLaguardia Act secure inclusion in private contracts of clauses ousting
diversity jurisdiction.
The discussion of Swift v. Tyson and Erie v. Tompkins is largely
drawn from the earlier edition. The newly added note on the rationale
of the Erie decision gives rather short shrift to Justice Brandeis' apparent conclusion that the rule was constitutionally compelled. The
accompanying note on ways of ascertaining state law tracks the earlier
edition, but omits the brief note in the earlier edition relating to the
appropriate weight to be given to rules and rulings on questions of
state law by state administrative agencies (first edition, page 630).
The discussion of the constitutional basis of Erie perhaps should have
made reference to the statement in Hanna v. Plumer,6 6 that:
we are reminded by the Erie opinion that neither Congress nor the
federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision
for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant
U.S. 1 (1972).
64 Id. at 10.
63 407

65 Home

Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874). Contrast Spatz v.

Nascone, 367 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973) which follows Bremen.
60 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of
the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because there
can be no other law.
Nor does it refer to Justice Harlan's observation in his concurring
opinion in Hanna v. Plumer relating to "primary decisions respecting
human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation:'
The new edition's note on "Forum Shopping and the Federal Rules"
raises some pertinent questions relating to the applicability of the
provisions of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence modifying
evidentiary privileges in diversity litigation.
The section of the chapter previously entitled "Federal Government and Federal Question Litigation" is now significantly recaptioned
"Federal Common Law." This section greatly extends the discussion
in the first edition. It refers to none of the extensive discussions of
implied federal remedies under the federal securities statutes other
than the treatise discussion by Professor Loss. It notes that liability
was upheld "in a casual footnote', in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Company.67 There is no discussion as to
whether the implication here was an implication from the jurisdictional
grant (as in the case of Case v. Borak), from the rescission provision,
or from the common law doctrine implying tort liability from criminal
statutes. The discussion includes a quotation from the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Farmers' Education and Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc.68 with its unanswered reference to
Hamilton's statement in Number 32 of the Federalist relating to congressional powers under the supremacy clause where it was observed
that a state's powers would be superseded if continued authority in
the state would be:
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant. . . . I use
these terms to distinguish this case from another which it might
appear to resemble, but which would, in fact, be essentially different: I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might
be productive of occasional interferences in the policy of any
branch of administration, but would not imply any' direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. 69
In the few months elapsing since the publication of this new edition
there have, of course, been highly significant developments in this
60404 U.S. 6 (1971).
68360 U.S. 525 (1959).
69 HART & WEcHsTxa at 802.
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field, including by way of example, the recent case on70state copyright
laws limiting the scope of the Stiffel-Compco doctrine.
There is a discussion of the decision by the Supreme Court in
Illinois v. Milwaukee,71 applying federal common law to pollution
cases, notwithstanding the earlier decision in Wyandotte Chemicals
2 The authors appropriately inquire as to "whether
Corporation.7
federal common law governs a suit to abate interstate pollution brought
by private persons."
The discussion of the opinion in Moragne v. State Marine, Inc.73
does not focus upon the problems created by that opinion's use of
closely related statutes as sources of law74 or the greater scope for
judicial latitudinarianism afforded by this adoption of the suggestions
of Dean Landis. 75 This may be a question of jurisprudence properly
so-called rather than a question of federal jurisdiction. But it is
unlikely that there is a better place in the law school curriculum for
students to be confronted with the problem.
VII
The discussion of challenges to federal jurisdiction and elements
of federal question jurisdiction is primarily the work of Professor
Mishkin. The discussion of the basic rule that jurisdictional questions
may be raised at any time during the course of the proceeding is
supplemented by a reference to the recent proposal of the American
Law Institute (A.L.I. Study, Section 1386, now before Congress as
Senate Bill 1776), which would preclude the raising of jurisdictional
issues by the parties after the beginning of trial except in special circumstances. The authors appear sympathetic to this proposal. The
difficulty with it is simply that it would for all practical purposes
result in the elimination of any clear division between areas of responsibility of the federal and state courts. Unfortunately, not all
lawyers, and particularly not all lawyers engaged in the defense of
state government litigation, have a clear understanding of the principles discussed at such length in this book. It is clear that much of
the litigation presently excluded from the federal courts is excluded
as a result of belated recognition of jurisdictional problems or by
See also Kewanee Oil Co. v.
70 Goldstein v. California, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
Bickron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1974).
71406 U.S. 91 (1972).
72401
73398

74
YALE

U.S. 493 (1971).
U.S. 375(1970).

Comment, The Legitimacit of Civil Law Reasoningin the Common Law, 82

L.J. 258 (1972).
75 J. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in

(1934).
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action by courts sua sponte. When a substantial number of courts
have exercised jurisdiction over a given subject matter of litigation,
parties promptly raising the jurisdictional question in other cases will,
it is safe to predict, be met with diminishing sympathy. Adoption of
the proposal will lead to a condition in which improvident exercises
of federal jurisdiction feed upon themselves. Many jurisdictional
questions, moreover, do not become apparent until trial or until
questions of relief are being considered.
There is a valuable critical discussion (at 890) of the provision,
only narrowly adopted by the American Law Institute, which would
permit removal on the basis of federal defenses. Given the recent
broadening of the fourteenth amendment and the extension of the
fourteenth amendment procedural due process requirements in the
areas of landlord-tenant relations, replevin, termination of welfare
benefits and like matters, the "federal defense" provision of Section
1312 will clearly multiply the number of questions which are potentially removable to the federal courts. In addition, the federal
defense provision has another serious consequence. It would operate
to virtually oust the state courts of a large number of readily identifiable areas of present jurisdiction. For example, under the National
Labor Relations Act state courts retain the power at present to enjoin
or award damages against violence in the context of labor disputes.
In any such case where an injunction against violence is sought,
preemption is raised as a defense and the question of state court jurisdiction resolves itself into a question of fact. The provisions of Section
1312(A) (2) would operate to permit all such cases to be automatically
removed to the federal courts since it can scarcely be said that in such
cases preemption is not a substantial defense. The states will thus
be denied their power to preserve domestic order through their own
officers in the context of labor disputes. Recent case law also provides substantial potential federal defenses based upon the New
York Times rule to virtually all action for libel and slander, an effect
welcomed by the draftsmen, though not by other commentators who
believe that the state courts serve a useful role in this field.70 The
effect of the provision allowing removal on the basis of federal defenses
will be to almost totally oust the state courts of their libel and slander
jurisdiction. And this is by no means an exhaustive listing of potential
problems. It is clear that a reasonably imaginative lawyer will be able
7
6See

Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in
judicial Machinery, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1972) (testimony of Hon. Henry J.
Friendly). See also Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy, 22 CArH.
U.L. REv. 1 (1972).
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to remove virtually any sort of lawsuit to the federal courts. This is
recognized by the draftsmen of the American Law Institute proposal
who continue to provide a jurisdictional amount requirement in order
to prevent the removal of small claims. However, the Constitution of
the United States does not contemplate that the state courts should
retain effective civil jurisdiction only over small claims. Nor is it easy
to share the apparent view of the draftsmen that only the federal
courts are competent to adjudicate claims and defenses arising under
the Constitution of the United States and the fourteenth amendment
guarantees of due process. It was not such a constitutional design
that induced the framers of the Constitution to include in article VI
a provision that "all executive and judicial officers, both of the United
States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation,
to support this Constitution .... "
The note on Monroe v. Pape and actions against state officers lists
the cases declaring that Section 1983 actions may not be defeated
because state law remedies were not first exhausted, but does not
suggest the possible limitations that will be placed upon the doctrine
urged by Judge Friendly and others; nor does it indicate that the
doctrine, which had its origins in Damico v. California,72 was developed
almost entirely in cases where either there was no plenary hearing
in the Supreme Court or jurisdictional questions were not raised or
argued. One somewhat startling feature of this development is
alluded to by the authors in a footnote quoting Professors Gellhom
and Byse,
Personal actions now do lie in federal court against the state func-

tionaries for deeds that, if performed by a federal employee, would
probably be held non-actionable.78

The authors perceptively note that the sixth footnote of the recent
decision in Lynch v. Household Finance Corporationeffectively leaves
open the question whether a remnant of the previous personal rightsproperty rights distinction may (apart from the Tax Injunction Act)
bar federal jurisdiction over challenges to state taxes even in instances
where there is no plain and efficient state remedy.
There is, as before, an extended discussion of the requirements of
the Three-Judge Court Acts. There is, however, little or no discussion
of the appropriateness of the courts' holdings, all of them without
consideration of the legislative history and without argument of the
point, that the Three-Judge Court Acts cannot be waived by state
officials. No case yet decided appears to squarely hold that a state
77389
U.S. 416 (1967).
78

HART & WECHSLER at 950 n.3.
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may not, by solemn and formal waiver in its first initial pleading, dispense with protections accorded it by the Three-Judge Court Acts;
the attempt seems never to have been made. Numerous cases recognize that the acts were enacted for the protection of the state government and not of plaintiff,79 a proposition which finds ample support
both in the writings of commentators80 and in legislative history. s
It may be possible for a court in a suitable case, if aided by state
counsel, to judicially draft limitations upon the applicability of the
statute which would reduce the administrative problems which it
presents to the federal judiciary and which will restore it to its originally
intended purpose. There is yet another possible limiting construction
of the statute not entirely foreclosed by the cases. This derives from
the avowed purpose of the statute to prevent what Justice Frankfurter
in the Phillips case referred to as the "improvident state-wide doom"
of a state's public policy. It is now clear that the "doom" of a statute,
as distinct from an injunction against its application to a particular
individual or a limited class of persons, can only result in the limited
class of cases where a statute may be attacked on its face, chiefly first
amendment cases. It is therefore arguable that the provisions of the
Three-Judge Court Acts ought not be applied save in cases where
the nature of the claim makes possible entry of a decree totally invalidating a statute. To so hold, however, would involve a greater
departure from present case law than would a holding that states
might solemnly and formally waive the protections of the Act.
The authors barely hint at the functional objections to three-judge
courts. Certainly it must be conceded that the quality of justice obtained by both the state- and private litigants where the three-judge
court mechanism is used is markedly inferior, both on trial and
appeal, to the quality of justice which would have been obtained had
most of these cases been initially heard before a single judge with the
right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The three-judge court provisions place the litigants on either side under heavy pressure to
stipulate to facts which in many instances should not be stipulated to
and to sharply limit the length of trials, usually to one day, in order
to avoid interference with the other judicial business of the participating judges and the calendars of their respective courts. In consequence, the usual three-judge court case involving important constitutional issues generally receives less attention from both court
and counsel than even the garden variety personal injury case, let
v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941).
80 Srdino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
81 H.R. RaE. No. 1584, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 42 CONG. REc. 4846 et seq., 45
CONG. REc. 7252 et seq. (1910).
'79 Phillips
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alone the garden variety antitrust case or a case involving equally
substantial questions. Further, the fact that the judges of the threejudge district courts are usually geographically scattered importantly
operates to limit the degree of collective deliberation that actually
goes into the preparation of opinions. The requirement of Rule 52
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the making of detailed
findings of fact is usually, because of the difficulties of judicial administration presented, honored more in the breach than in the observance by these tribunals, The rendition of the ultimate opinion is
frequently delayed. The mechanism could not be better calculated
to produce superficiality in the disposition of great public questions
since the pressures toward cursory presentation at trial are so great.
The provisions for direct appellate review by the Supreme Court
multiply and aggravate these ills, since not only are the trials truncated
trials but the appeals are in reality discretionary appeals rather than
appeals as of right in consequence of the state of the Supreme Court
docket. The broadening and sharpening of issues that can and should
result in the appellate process to the benefit of the courts and counsel
for both sides is not really present in three-judge court cases.
It must be conceded that history indicates that a strong case does
exist for allowing the states the right to request a three-judge court
in actions involving the validity of state legislation. This may in
exceptional circumstances be a desirable safeguard, particularly in
judicial districts where the number of sitting federal judges is limited
and the provision thus guards against an excessive concentration of
judicial power over a state's legislation. For this reason the American
Law Institute proposal would seem preferable to the alternate
proposal put forward by Chief Justice Burger in his State of the
Judiciary message before the American Bar Association in August,
1972.82

The discussion of the Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction Act
overlooks the extended discussion of Tax Injunction Act issues in the
otherwise unrelated case of Samuels v. Mackell,s3 which clearly reasserted the applicability of the provisions of the Act to actions for
declaratory judgment as well as for injunction. The discussion of the
Tax Injunction Act gives only limited treatment of the question as to
What is a tax injunction, a question which arises in cases involving
attacks on the relationship between taxes and expenditures and in
cases attacking inequality in assessment practices.
The discussion of exhaustion of state administrative requirements
47 U.S.L.W. 2094 (1972), cf. ALI Proposal, §§ 1374, 1376(a).
83 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
82
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under the Civil Rights Act appropriately notes the perfunctory nature
of many of the recent Supreme Court opinions on the subject. The
recent decision of the Supreme Court declining to dispense with
exhaustion requirements in a Civil Rights Act action attacking confinement of a prisoner may mark the end to this wooden application
of the Civil Rights Act. Again, the treatise appropriately notes the
total inconsistency of these holdings with the original federal design:
The court's casual evading of the requirement of exhaustion in
Civil Bights Act cases is to be contrasted with its careful articu-

lation of the exhaustion requirements and its exceptions in cases
challenging federal administration action.84

Professor Davis pertinently inquires:
Comparing federal court review of federal administrative action
and federal court review of state administrative action, must federal
administrative remedies be exhausted in circumstances in which
state administrative remedies need not be exhausted, and if so,
why? Why not precisely the opposite?85

The discussion of the abstention doctrine carefully notes the more
recent developments including the cases holding that abstention may
be appropriate, even in cases founded on equal protection claims
under the fourteenth amendment. The discussion also suggests that
in light of Burford v. Sun Oil Company,s6 abstention may sometimes
be appropriate even in the absence of uncertainty in the state law
which would eliminate the need of deciding a federal issue. This facet
of the abstention doctrine has not been recognized by all courts, some
of whose precedents are divided among themselves on these questions. 8 7
The authors enumerate ten factors which might appropriately be
thought to bear on the use of the abstention doctrines. To these factors
might be added the effect of federal court intervention upon state
budgetary and fiscal schemes by analogy to the Tax Injunction Act
and its policy. Abstention in such circumstances may be peculiarly
appropriate since remedies may be available to the state courts which
are denied the federal courts by the eleventh amendment, the Tax
Injunction Act and other provisions of the law.
The newly provided certification procedure adopted by some states
is discussed. The note purporting to supply a definitive listing of such
state provisions overlooks the provisions of at least one state.88
84

85

HAT & WECHSLER at 985.

See K. DAVIS, ADNuNIsTarAriv LAw TtEATisE § 20.01,

88319
U.S. 315 (1943).
7

at 646 (Supp. 1970).

: Compare Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1972) with Wohl
v. Keene, 476 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1973).
88 MD. Aim. CODE art. 26 § 171 et. seq. (1973). See Lehman Bros. v. Schein,
94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974).
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There is an extended and able discussion of Younger v. Harris
and related cases. There is also a discussion of the important issues
presented by the American Law Institute recommendations for modification of the present anti-injunction law.89 That proposal would
significantly undermine the holding of Younger v. Harrisby permitting
federal court injunctions
to restrain a criminal prosecution that should not be permitted to
continue either because the statute or other law that is the basis
of the prosecution plainly cannot constitutionally be applied to the
parties seeking the injunction, or because the prosecution is so
plainly discriminatory as to amount to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
Professor Wright, one of the draftsmen of the American Law Institute
proposals, has told the Senate Committee that this proposal "may
require re-examination to be sure that it does not reopen the door to
federal injunctions of this kind any more widely than it was left open
by Younger v. Harris."0 Younger v. Harris provides for the availability of federal injunctions generally only when the statute challenged is unconstitutional on its face. The proposed new head of
federal injunction jurisdiction would be a fertile breeder of litigation,
and would, in all probability, impair the capacity of the states to
enforce their criminal law with reasonable dispatch. The draftsmen
of the American Law Institute proposals recognized that expansion
of the federal removal jurisdiction in criminal cases was inadvisable,
and the considerations there adduced by them would seem to be
equally applicable to federal injunctive relief, by which the federal
courts, unlike their role in removal cases, exercise power without
responsibility for the further conduct of proceedings. Certainly there
is no more vital area of state power than the power of the states over
criminal cases, the effectiveness of which must be maintained if we
are not to have government by national policing agencies. The delays
which would be produced by litigation under the American Law Institute's proposed Section 1372(7), particularly in controversial cases,
would in all probability operate to discredit the criminal laws and
discredit the power of the states to enforce the criminal law.
The discussion of federal diversity jurisdiction is the work of
Professor Shapiro. The discussion of the history of diversity jurisdiction is supplemented by a discussion of the currently pending American
Law Institute proposals. In summarizing the respects in which the
American Law Institute diversity proposals would expand diversity
89
ALI Study, § 1372(7).
90

HAnT & WECHSLER at 1049-50.
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jurisdiction the new edition does not stress the effect of the proposals
(Proposed Sections 1302(b) (1) and (3)) relating to diversity jurisdiction in cases involving unincorporated associations. These proposals
would make such associations citizens of only the place where their
national headquarters is situated unless such associations maintain a
"local establishment". The definition of local establishment in the
proposals is such as to, in effect, exclude most political and social
action organizations and, probably, most unions from the local establishment provisions. One effect of the American Law Institute proposals relating to diversity jurisdiction in respect to voluntary associations would thus be to make it possible for any voluntary association with standing to sue to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of
the district courts to vindicate claims arising purely under state law
where the necessary jurisdictional amount is present. It is not unlikely
that the effect of such a provision would be to thrust into the federal
courts an ever increasing number of environmental, land use, and
zoning controversies which the present provisions exclude from them.
It is also likely that these provisions would operate to allow the processes of the federal courts to be invoked in cases involving state
employee labor relations excluded from the National Labor Relations
Act and hence from the present jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Neither the American Law Institute commentary nor the new edition
of the Hart and Wechsler Treatise (apart from cursory discussion at
1093-94) recognize the practical significance of the proposed changes
in jurisdiction in cases involving voluntary associations. In light of
the liberalization of standing doctrine worked by such cases as Sierra
Club v. Morton and Association of Data Processorsv. Camp, this consequence of any change in the rules governing the place of residence
of voluntary associations should scarcely be overlooked.
There is an extended additional note on ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction in diversity cases. There is also an extended new note on
corporate citizenship discussing developments under Section 1332 (C)
of the Judicial Code and added subsequent to the first edition. There
is only limited discussion of the issues surrounding the application
of the diversity jurisdiction to corporations, and the summary of arguments supporting and opposing diversity adapted from the original
edition with its quotations from an article by Professor Wechsler
omits what appear to this writer to be some of the more significant
points that may be made against retention of the jurisdiction. The
growth of businesses of national scope, far from supplying an argument in favor of jurisdiction, has increasingly had the effect of all but
eliminating important commercial litigation from the state courts,
save in major industrial centers or states such as New Jersey and
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Delaware. In consequence such businesses and the counsel that represent them have little inducement to take a keen interest in the operation of state court systems and in the selection of state court judges.
In many portions of the country a considerable portion of the Bar
of the state has its practice almost entirely in the federal courts. The
failure to impose limits upon the invocation of diversity jurisdiction by
corporations in an era in which an ever increasing number of commercial cases falls within its potential scope will have the result of
virtually denuding the state courts of important commercial litigation
and will cause them to increasingly become courts of general jurisdiction in name only. It is not in my view desirable that the jurisdiction of state courts be effectively restricted to criminal cases, small
claims, and cases involving real property and domestic relations, nor
will the capacity of state courts to attract competent judges to deal
with these concededly vitally important subjects be enhanced by
acquiescing in the almost total removal of important constitutional
and commercial litigation from their courts. The affirmative arguments for diversity jurisdiction appear likewise increasingly attenuated
in an age distinguished by national communications and a high degree
of personal mobility in which problems founded on local prejudice
are of increasingly small importance. The extraordinarily complex
nature of the American Law Institute proposals to restrict diversity
jurisdiction is noted, though not in detail; even "abolitionists" will
experience a difficult time in defending the "commuter" provision:
it is academic draftsmanship at its worst.
VIII
The discussion of general problems of district court jurisdiction
is the work of Professor Shapiro. The portions of the chapter dealing
with the bringing of unincorporated associations into court has been
drastically truncated to the detriment of its reference value. There is
an extended and able discussion of forum non conveniens which
makes repeated reference to the important article by Professor Kitch.9 '
Only one paragraph, however, is devoted to the important provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, establishing the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation. No discussion of the case law under this provision is included, though there is a quotation of a law review article which
asserts that "the practical result of transfer under Section 1407 has
been a transfer for all purposes." That statement, in this commentator's experience, is accurate. The authors do not discuss how
91 Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or InIND. L.J. 99 (1965).

justice, 40
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compatible this development is with the policy of the underlying venue
statutes or, for that matter, with due process of law. The effect of the
provision is to require plaintiffs with a right to institute suit in a given
jurisdiction to litigate cases at the other end of the country and to
have their mode of proceeding, the time table of their cases and the
course of discovery proceedings in them made dependent upon the
procedures and trial tactics of counsel in dozens of other consolidated
cases. The authors do not discuss in detail the developments giving
rise to enactment of this Section or its implications for the future of a
system of justice hitherto based upon individualized determination of
legal rights. Nor is there discussion of the possible alternatives to
use of this device, which include: (a) the broadening of doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel following the example of Bernhard
v. Bank of America;92 (b) restriction of the provisions of Rule 23,
which have supplied a major impetus to the creation of the caseload
which required enactment of the new section; (c) restriction of the
right to sue for antitrust damages following a government judgment
and the replacement of actions by parties damaged only as consumers,
and not more specially damaged, with a more adequate government
fine structure resembling that of the Common Market countries;
and (d) alteration of the venue statutes insofar as they bear on
"mass tort" cases.
The discussion of jurisdictional amount is appropriately expanded.
This discussion once more notes the paradox that the federal courts
are afforded jurisdiction of civil rights actions against state officers
irrespective of jurisdictional amount while actions against federal
officers based on analogous claims are frequently excluded from the
federal courts in consequence of the jurisdictional amount requirement.93 It is noted that the Administrative Conference of the United
States has recommended that the requirement of jurisdictional amount
be deleted in "any action in which the plaintiff alleges that he has
been injured or threatened with injury by an officer or employee of
the United States or any agency thereof acting under color of federal
law." 94
There is also an able discussion of the issues presented by the
Snyder case relating to aggregation of claims in class actions. One
salutary effect of the Snyder decision is the effective exclusion of many
class actions from the federal courts. The total elimination of jurisdictional amount requirements in federal question litigation would
92 122
93
94

P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
E.g., Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1964).
HA]T & Wxcnsimi at 1162.
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have marked effects upon the federal court caseload. It is true that
many of the most important categories of class actions may already freely
be brought in the federal courts by reason of the judicial expansion
of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1337, ably described by the authors.
But that fact can scarcely justify the further loosening of restraints
on federal class actions. Even defenders of the class action rule and
advocates of additional federal class action statutes have recognized
the necessity of numerous additional restrictions to prevent abuse.
Reversal of Snyder v. Harris, without more, would aggravate the
presently existing problems without curing perceived evils. It is for
this reason that it is difficult to applaud Section 1311 of the American
Law Institute proposals which in totally dispensing with jurisdictional
amount requirements in federal question cases would aggrandize the
volume of federal class actions. The commentators appropriately
noted that "elimination of the requirement of satisfying the jurisdictional amount would nullify the risk of damaging restrictions on the
effective operation of the [class action] rule." Alteration of the
Snyder rule would thus not seem an appropriate part of the present
consideration of the proposals by the Senate Judiciary Committee and
indeed, given the pendency of class action issues in other committees
of the Congress, would be "sleeper" legislation at its worst. The
present writer has commented elsewhere on the difficulties surrounding
class actions;9 5 little can be added to what was said in a different
context by Dean Allen of the University of Michigan Law School:
The courts are well adapted to weigh the competing claims of individual litigants; but they are poorly equipped to resolve broad issues of policy involving, for example, the reallocation of resources
among large social groups or classes. Judicial lawmaking in the
latter areas is confronted with a dual peril: it may ignore considerations relevant to intelligent policy formation, or in taldng
them into account, it may inspire doubts about the integrity of the
judicial process. 96

The discussion of federal jurisdiction over condemnation cases,
matters of probate and administration, and domestic relations matters
is usefully updated.
The note on removal jurisdiction has likewise been usefully updated. The discussion of the civil rights removal jurisdiction impliedly
endorses Professor Amsterdam's analysis of the history of the statute.
The significant recent holding of the Fourth Circuit in South Carolina
95
Liebmann, Economic Crimes: The Proposed FederalCriminal Code, 27 Bus.
LAW. 177 181 (1971).
96 Alien, Preface to E. FREUND, STANDAmUs or AmmumcAN LEcISLATION at
xxviii, xxix (2d ed. 1965).
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v. Moore,97 though cited in the earlier general discussion, is not cited
in the context of the civil rights removal statute. It deserves quotation:
Since Section 1443 permits the filing of a removal petition at any
time before trial in a state court, the conclusion that subsequent proceedings in the state court, before remand, are absolutely void
creates a great potential for disruption of judicial proceedings in
the state courts. It permits one wishing to delay a state trial to do
so, even though his removal petition is subsequently found to be
frivolous. It is a situation which deserves congressional attention
for that kind of disruption of state court proceedings seems wholly
unnecessary and unwarranted. There are many approaches an
amendatory statute might take. Perhaps the one which would best
preserve the utility and protect the purpose of the civil rights removal act would be a provision foreclosing the right to file such a
removal petition within a ten day period preceding any scheduled
trial, provided the defendant had failed to act earlier after a
reasonable opportunity to obtain and consult a lawyer. Perhaps by
statute Congress could simply revive the Rives-Metropolitan rule,
so that a state court might proceed at its own risk, knowing that a
subsequent remand order would validate its proceedings. If the
state judge thought the petition frivolous, he might well conclude
to go on with the proceedings in the state court. The solution,
however, appears one for congressional choice.
In discussing Professor Amsterdam's view of the removal statute,
the text of the new edition notes that he "dramatically emphasized
the harm to the civil rights movement that can be caused by groundless and discriminatory prosecutions, even if all convictions are
ultimately set aside." Inexplicably, however, there is no reference
to the harm that can be caused to existing state law, and to the power
of states to administer any public policy, by the sort of wholesale
removals possible under the present law and undertaken repeatedly in the early 1960's. The authors appropriately note that
Professor Amsterdam "was involved in the litigation of a number of civil rights removal cases" but failed to note that this is,
in light of their numbers and significance, perhaps the understatement of the decade. In fact, it is accurate to say that the enforcement
of existing trespass laws in many of the southern states prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was effectively brought to a halt
by use of the federal removal device at a time when no action,
legislative or judicial, had invalidated that particular adjustment of
personal property rights. The treatises discussion of the issues presented by the removal statute thus seems somewhat one-sided. The
authors observe that the American Law Institute study would leave
07 447

F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1971).
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the civil rights removal provisions almost unchanged, but do not note
the change that would be worked by § 1382(e), which would provide
that a petition for removal of a criminal case may not be filed after
the commencement of the trial. It is difficult.to understand why this
proposed reform measure fails to go further and to deal with the more
pressing problem of the filing of petitions for removal immediately
prior to the commencement of a state criminal trial.9 8
There is a useful discussion of the history of § 2283 of the Judicial
Code. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the Leiter Minerals9
and Nash-Finch00o cases underline the traditional indulgence of the
federal courts to the federal government's right to sue for injunctive
relief, and the tendency to read statutory restrictions upon that power
narrowly.10 '
IX
The chapter on federal government litigation by Professor Wechsler
is in many respects the most disappointing chapter in the book. In
this respect, the book resembles the first edition.102 The chapter
begins with the discussion of the Hudson and Coolidge cases and the
doctrine denying federal jurisdiction over common law crimes. This
is followed by a thorough discussion of federal criminal jurisdiction
in federal enclaves. The discussion does not stress what is for the
author the most compelling argument against special federal statutes
for enclaves: that a federal statute not assimilating state law can constitute the enclave an island within the state undermining state policy,
particularly with respect to sumptuary offenses.
The discussion of non-territorial federal crimes is highly inadequate. There is a brief notation that most federal prosecutions involve
the enforcement of "national penal statutes enacted in the exercise of
the- constitutionally defined powers of Congress, generously supplemented by the necessary and proper clause." There is no discussion
of the possible constitutional limitations upon federal criminal jurisdiction. The only cases cited on the substantive reach of federal
criminal jurisdiction are the Screws 10 3 case, the Rutkin0 4 case and the
Kahrigero5 case, all cited in the first- edition. No mention is made
98
See Turco v. Maryland, 324 F. Supp. 61, 68 (D. Md. 1970); Maryland v.
Brown, 311 F. Sum. 1164 (1970); Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 68, 69 n.8
(D. Md.
1969); alled by the same counsel and all delaying impending state trials.
99
Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).

10oNLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
101 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

1o2 HART & WECHSLER (Ist
103 Screws v. United States,

ed.) at 1086-1107.
325 U.S. 91 (1945).
1o4 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
105 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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of such important subsequent decisions as United States v. Guest,10 6
Stirone v. United States, 07 Katzenbach v. McClung, 08 and Perez V.
United States,10 9 supporting expansive federal criminal statutes, nor
is there any discussion of the negative inferences that may be drawn
from expressions in these opinions relating to the limits upon federal
criminal jurisdiction or the three important cases declining to broadly
read the federal criminal statutes in the gambling, 0 firearms, and
labor racketeering"' contexts, in part because of problems of constitutional dimension which would arise upon a broad reading. The
discussion of double jeopardy problems has been somewhat updated,
thoughtful work by Miller on double
though without reference to the 112
system.
federal
the
and
jeopardy
Almost the entire remainder of the discussion is devoted to a
lengthy discussion of the proposed new federal criminal code prepared
by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.
Again, the appropriateness of anticipating the enactment of such
sweeping proposals, in place of a discussion of the existing law, is at
the least doubtful. The discussion notes that "the views Professor
[Louis B.] Schwartz expressed in his [1948] article are reflected in
the new Federal Criminal Code proposed by the National Commission." Reference might appropriately have been made here to the
even more expansive views as to the appropriate scope of federal
criminal jurisdiction expressed by Professor Schwartz in another
context, 113 and to the views of his co-commentators at the symposium
in question. The chapter is bereft of any account of the historical
development of federal criminal jurisdiction and while there is a
paucity of literature in this field, there are a number of works which
deserve mention at least in a bibliographical footnote.114 The extended
excerpt from the proposed code is likely to seriously mislead the student as to the present status of the law. Thus, the code's defense of
its proposed piggy-back jurisdiction is set out in detail, but the treatise
106 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
307

361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).

108 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

109'402"U.S. 146-(1971).
110 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
111 Enmons v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1973); Bass v. United States, 404
U.S. 336 (1972). See also United States v. Maze, 94 S. Ct. 645 (1974).
112L. MmLEn, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AN TE FEDE.AL SYSTEM (1968).
113 Alien, Kenison, Willens and Schwartz, Role of the Federal, State and Local
Governments in the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Panel, 1961 REP. ABA
SECTION OF CBmnNAL LAw 80.
114 E.g., A. MILLSPAUGH, CRLME

CONTROL BY THE NATIONAL GoVERNmENT
McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUsTcE (1937); CONBOY,
FEDERAL CdnNA.L LAW IN LAW: A CENTumy OF PRoa.,Ess 1835-1935 at 294-346

(1937); H. CUNINGcs & C.
(1937).
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includes no discussion of the limited case law supporting the constitutionality of the proposal which as yet includes no Supreme
Court cases.'1 5 No mention is made of the great practical increase in
federal theft jurisdiction created by the proposals. The discussion
of the proposal to eliminate any culpability requirement with respect
to any fact which is solely a basis for federal jurisdiction, by quoting
the Brown Commission Commentary, creates the impression that the
cases relied upon by the Brown Commission in support of its proposal
stand alone, but the student is not informed that the cases reflect the
minority view." 0 Similarly, the Brown Commission's citation of
United States v. Kellerman" 7 in support of its proposal to eliminate
any requirement of culpability as to jurisdictional facts in inchoate
offenses is presented to the student, but no reference is made to the
other decisions of the Second Circuit, including opinions of Judge
Learned Hand," 8 which limit the Kellerman rule. The footnote appropriately criticizes the Brown Commission proposal which would
erect an absolute bar to subsequent state prosecutions where there
has been a prior federal prosecution but which would permit a
federal prosecution to go forward following a state prosecution if
approved by the Attorney General. There is a bibliographical note on
the code noting criticism of it including articles by the present reviewer. It is also noted that the bases of federal auxiliary jurisdiction
as set out in the proposed code are broader than "the criteria suggested by Professor Schwartz" in his 1948 article "as justifying federal
action." There is a summary reference to the significance to the defendant of federal as distinct from state prosecution with respect to
matters such as venue and place of imprisonment, but there is no discussion of the significance of the differences as respects the size and
role of federal policing agencies. The discussion does, however, significantly suggest that the proposals for discretionary restraint in the
exercise of federal jurisdiction contained in § 207 of the Brown Commission report should be regarded as litigable standards at least in
prosecutions under a "piggy-back" base. One infers that Professor
Wechsler does not agree with the somewhat frantic and unconvincing
efforts that have been made to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of
15 Hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures,92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3245 (1971).
316 Id. at 3246. The sweeping proposals relating to the law of attempt are
criticized by Judge Aldisert in United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 172
(8d Cir. 1973).
117 431 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1970).
118 E.g., United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339 (2d. Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1948).
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such an approachnP-efforts difficult to understand in light of other
modem instances providing for judicial review of delegated authority.
The strange, indeed bizarre, Brown Commission proposals relating
to regulatory offenses are set out verbatim without great discussion.
A pertinent question is asked: "[I]s criminal conviction appropriate
for conduct which is not commonly regarded as intrinsically anti-social,
in the absence of a showing of deliberate defiance or disregard of the
law?" There is no discussion here of the important questions relating
to the extent to which mens rea may be a constitutional requirement.
Obviously the present work is not a case book on criminal law. On the
other hand, the constitutional limits upon federal criminal jurisdiction
receive virtually no discussion in criminal law case books or even in
those on constitutional law. Under these circumstances some discussion might have been included here at least as to jurisdictional limitations properly so-called. Likewise, one finds no discussion whatever
of the original constitutional understanding with respect to the criminal
jurisdiction of the national government as reflected in the Federalist
Papers and the ratification debates, though such discussions do appear
in the portions of the treatise concerned with civil rather than criminal
jurisdiction.
There is a short paragraph on the Federal Magistrates Act which
notes, referring to the Brown Commission proposals, that "the utility
of the procedure for those regulatory offenses that the proposed code
would reduce to class A or class B misdemeanors is apparent.., such
a development has long been urged." The student is not likely to
glean from this brief discussion the idea that many people regard
the right to require the federal government to hold proceedings
against the individual before a judge with life tenure and irreducible
compensation to be an important right and an important part of our
working Constitution; rather, the matter is treated as some sort of
administrative technicality.
The'implicit criticism of the Brown Commission proposals in the
very brief notes on them is to be welcomed. One must regret that
none of these observations were repeated in Professor Wechsler's
testimony before the McClellan Committee on the Commission proposals.120 There is a pertinent note on federal criminal venue which
notes the failure of the new federal criminal code to address itself to
venue problems and the possible implications for venue of the
altered approach of the proposed code. Again, the practical and
110 Supra note 115, at 3389.
120 Id. at 520.

1030

0ENTUcKY

LAW JomuNAL

[Vol. 62

political importance of venue restrictions underlined by Justice Jackson's opinion in Krulewich'2l is not pointed out to the student. The
discussion of venue also omits the significant dictum in Smith v. United
22
States.
The discussion of civil actions instituted by the federal government
commences with the discussion on the implication of rights of action
by the United States and hints that non-statutory executive authority
to bring suit is virtually unlimited in cases involving a widespread
public interest. There is no reference here to the recent thorough
Harvard Law Review note reaching a contrary conclusion.1 23 There
follows a brief note on primary jurisdiction, not notably up to date.
There is a useful note on intervention by or on behalf of the government and on cumulative remedies and the control of government
litigation. There is a discussion of the authority of the government
to settle or compromise government cases of a civil nature. This
discussion points up the absence of a comparable discussion of issues
surrounding nolo contendere pleas in criminal litigation and the
question-reopened by the recent proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure-concerning the right of a defendant
without government consent to plead to a lesser included offense. 2 4
There is a brief reference to the issues presented by qui tam actions,
which is not significantly updated to reflect developments under the
Federal Refuse Act, the area of greatest practical importance of such
actions.
There is a note on special doctrines favoring the United States as
plaintiff which appears new to this edition. The section points up the
reluctance of the courts to generously construe restrictions upon the
powers of the national government to seek injunctive relief.
There is also an extended discussion of actions against federal
agencies which does not take particular note of the American Law
Institutes proposals for changes in the removal jurisdiction in suits
25
against federal officers.'
The discussion of sovereign immunity begins by discussing the
possible bases of such immunity, which it summarizes as:
the traditional immunity of the sovereign, .. . the inability of the
courts to enforce a judgment,... that there can be no legal right
21
Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
1223 60 U.S. 1, 8 n.1 (1959).
123 Comment, Nonstatutory Executive Authority to Bring Suit, 85 HAMv. L.
Bxv. 1566 (1972). There is also no discussion of the limits on federal criminal
equity, compare 5 J. Moone, Fnr..A PRACTICE 1138.241].
124 Proposed amendments to Cum. Pnoc. 40.1 (January, 1973).
125 ALI Proposals, § 1383(a).
1
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as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends, ... [and] avoidance of interference with governmental

functions and with the government's control over its instrumentalities, funds, and property.

It may be that students of the doctrine might have more sympathy
for its at least limited preservation if reference were made to its
significance as a protection of the legislative power of the purse and
its importance for the separation of powers.
Reference is made to the original rule precluding the liability of
the United States for costs in the absence of an authorizing statute
and to the continued exclusion of attorneys' fees from costs recoverable against the federal government. Again, the parodox may be noted
that in recent years federal courts have, without consideration of
either sovereign immunity or eleventh amendment questions, commenced awarding attorneys' fees against state governments.
There is an extended discussion of mandamus jurisdiction and of
the changes made by the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962. The
discussion of the Youngstown case in the earlier edition, an admirable
treatment, is carried forward verbatim. There might usefully have
been included a discussion of subsequent judicial treatment of the
Youngstown precedent. There is an extended discussion of official
immunity of federal officers which concludes with the pertinent questions:
Is there any conceivable justification for according state officials
under Section 1983 a narrower immunity than is accorded federal
officials sought to be held accountable under the standing law?
Is the historic purpose of the civil rights laws any more compelling
than the provisions of the Constitution and the Acts of Congress

governing, and therefore limiting, federal official action?
The recent development under the Bivens case and particularly
the recent decision of Judge Medina on remand may alter this condition at least as to federal officers with policing responsibilities, a
timely development in light of the concurrently impending proposals
to expand the criminal jurisdiction of the national government. It has
not yet been determined whether Judge Medina was correct in his
statement that in Bivens "the Supreme Court recognized a right of
action against federal officers that is roughly analogous to the right
of action against state officers that was provided when Congress enacted the Civil Bights Act,"126 although two recent dicta of the Su120456 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d
1163, 1166 (3d Cr. 1971).
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preme Court127 support the proposition with the apparent qualification
that jurisdictional amount requirements must be met.
X
The chapter on federal habeas corpus is primarily the work of
Professor Bator and reflects the present uncertainty in the state of the
law. It notes the reference of proposed changes in habeas corpus
procedure to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules following
the decision of the Court in Harris v. Nelson,128 and the provisions of
the Federal Magistrates Act authorizing or purporting to authorize
the delegation to federal magistrates of the task of giving preliminary
review to post conviction petitions.12 9 Subsequent to publication, the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules published proposals which
would give federal magistrates a very large role indeed in the disposition of federal habeas corpus petitions. Mr. Justice Jackson's
observation that he who is required to look for a needle in a haystack
is likely to conclude that the needle is not worth the search thus
appears fully vindicated by the response of the federal judiciary
to the burdens placed upon it by the great expansion of the availability
of the writ to state prisoners. It surely ought to be of some concern
that one effect of this over-extension of the great writ has been the
debasement of the procedural protections which it provides and the
proposed removal of its practical administration from judges with life
tenure to officers of less independence and competence. The proposed
rules, it should be noted, extend not only to federal habeas corpus for
state prisoners but also to § 2255 proceedings, 130 and the consequence
of the extension of the habeas rules in state proceedings has been a
proposed debasement of the checks placed upon abuses in federal
prosecutions.
Professor Bator also appropriately notes the difficulties into which
the Supreme Court has been led by its failure to distinguish between
the scope of review available with respect to constitutional questions
on direct appeal and the scope of review available with respect to
such questions on federal habeas corpus. The consequence of this
failure has been the growth of an increasingly confused body of law
concerning retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions:
Suppose a state court correctly decides an issue of constitutional
law in a criminal case; but after that case becomes 'final' the Su127 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973)
and City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
128 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
129 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970).
130 Proposed Rule 11 (Habeas Corpus), Proposed Rule 10 (§ 2255 proceedings) (January, 1973). CompareWingo v. Wedding, 94 S. Ct. 2842 (1974).
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preme Court changes the governing constitutional principle. Is
the person to be deemed to be unlawfully detained for purposes
of federal habeas corpus? . . . This question has never been answered (or even addressed) as such by the Court. Rather it has
merged into a novel, growing and staggeringly intricate body of
law governing the question whether new constitutional doctrines

should be "retroactively" or "prospectively" applied. The most
striking feature of this body of law is the court's assertion of a
general power to decide whether and to what extent new doetrines of constitutional law should apply retrospectively; and no
distinction-or at least no distinction in principle-has been drawn
for this purpose between cases involving collateral attack and cases
still open to direct attack (or even untried) when the new doctrine
was announced.131
The treatise appropriately notes the highly persuasive separate
opinion by Justice Harlan in Williams v. United States.132 It is obvious
that if Justice Harlan's view were accepted most of the problems associated with the retroactivity of new decisions would disappear. The
problems remaining-those relating to the status of the limited number
of cases pending on direct review at the time a new decision was
rendered-would not appear appropriately dealt with by a doctrine
of non-retroactivity; rather, as Justice Black insisted, the cases involving such litigants should be appropriately entitled to reversal.
The present practice of allowing the court to select the effective date
of its opinions and dispensing with the doctrine that the court declares
and does not invent law has the consequence of bringing about the
virtual obliteration of the line between judicial and legislative responsibility. The fact that a limited number of reversals of cases on
direct appeal will result from a new decision, absent this practice, is
scarcely to be regretted. Rather the prospect of such reversals will and
should operate as a limited but not prohibitive deterrent to excessive
and unsignaled judicial lawmaking.
With respect to the oft-repeated suggestion that states should make
their post conviction remedies coextensive with the federal habeas
corpus remedy, the authors also have some pertinent questions:
Why should the states be required to create special remedies for
the litigation of federal claims if those claims are in any event
going to be relitigated in a federal district court? Whatever the
duty should it not in any event be allowed to remain inchoate
until such
time as the federal courts are unavailable to hear such
1 33
claims?
131

H.nT & WECHSLEm at 1477-78.
U.S. 646, 667 (1971).
132401
13 3
at 1493.
HART & Wrcsasmi
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The current suggestion seems little more than a request that the states
provide special masters to the federal judiciary. There is something
peculiarly anomalous about suggestions of this sort, since the scope of
federal habeas corpus review is largely the product of historical accident. Certainly it is anomalous that retroactive application of new
constitutional standards can result in reversal of a criminal conviction
even in the absence of a reason to believe that the "improperly"
admitted evidence affected determination of the case at a time when
the three subjects most clearly excluded from federal habeas corpus
review are (a) the sufficiency of the evidence, (b) newly discovered
evidence (save that bearing on deprivation of constitutional right)
and (c) the fairness of the sentence. To ask state governments to
reconstruct their apparatus of appellate and post conviction review to
duplicate the anomalies of federal habeas corpus is a strange suggestion for any advocate of reform.
The new edition discusses at length the powerful attack by Judge
Friendly on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kaufman v. United
States,"34 a decision which occupies a precarious position in light of
recent expressions by new members of the court.
XI
The chapter on appellate review of federal decisions is primarily
the work of Professor Shapiro. The discussion of finality for purposes
of appeal makes only cursory mention of the cases involving finality
problems under Rule 23.
A valuable note has been added on congestion in the Courts of
Appeals and on possible and proposed measures to deal with such
congestion. There is no discussion here of the extent to which the
terms of the federal statutes giving a right of appeal may operate to
limit or confine the adoption of some of these suggestions. 135 The
bibliographical note at 1574 probablya6 should also have included the
valuable article by Judge Hufstedler."
The discussion of the obligatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
has been significantly updated. The valuable note on the two court
rule in the first edition appears to have disappeared in the new edition,
notwithstanding the continuing vitality of the rule. The discussion of
the Supreme Court's certiorari policy eliminates the material relating
to the 1937 court packing fight contained in the first edition, an un134394

U.S. 217 (1969).

135 But see Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 195 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
136 Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids,44 So. CAL. L. REv. 901 (1971).
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fortunate omission. However, the note on Rule 38 and the general
discussion of factors bearing upon the grant of certiorari have been
significantly expanded and updated.
Conclusion
In summary, the new edition appears, despite occasional weaknesses, to be a worthy successor to the original edition and little of
value in the original edition has been omitted from its successor. Both
it and contemporary case books on constitutional law might have
profited from inclusion of some of the literature relating to the values
served by federalism under modem conditions and by some comparative reference to the resolutions of similar problems in other
federal systems, such as those of Australia, Canada, West Germany
and Switzerland. Much has traditionally been said about the experimental or empirical value of the federal system, though less has been
said in recent years of its more traditional justifications as a means of
limiting the issues that are the subject matter of national politics and
limiting the depth of political divisions on a national scale, even though
this feature of federalism provides its greatest appeal to many foreign
observers. 37 Little has been said also of the significance of a horizontal division of authority in limiting, particularly in the spheres
of education and criminal law, the growth of federal institutions and
bureaucracies which would be uncontrollable by anyone including
the national legislature. Notwithstanding the disclaimers of the preface, the present work will seem largely a technical exercise to many
students not exposed to these larger questions and issues. Such students are likely to accept uncritically the frequently reiterated proposition that Wickard v. Filburn and its progeny marked the passing
of any functional divisions between the appropriate powers of the
national and state governments and are likely also to accept equally
uncritically the frequently reiterated statements about the passing
of dual federalism and the accompanying assurances that the political
safeguards of federalism delineated by Professor Wechsler provide an
adequate substitute for any sort of judicial control of the expansion
of national government powers. The increasing nationalization of the
presidential nominating and election process, together with the
changes wrought by provision for the direct election of Senators and
the development of agencies of mass communication, have in any
realistic view greatly attenuated these safeguards. Nor do decisions
137RE.g., C. DEGAuLLF,

(1971).
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rendered in the context of national regulation of business enterprise
have compelling force where the central questions at issue are questions relating to the maintenance of public order, as Mr. Justice Jackson reminded us shortly before his death.138 The mechanical application of the Wickard principle in these other areas appears to give
force to Whitehead's observation that the liberating principles of
one generation are the confining principles of the next. It should also
be striking that the prevailing view about the unlimited nature of
the commerce powers of the national government is one which in
extraordinary and striking measure does not command the acquiescence
of the modem intellectual leaders of the courts, notwithstanding its
repeated reiteration by commentators. Neither for Justice Brandeis
nor for Justice Cardozo nor for Justice Frankfurter nor for Justice
Jackson nor for Justice Black nor for Judge Learned Hand nor for
Judge Friendly were the commerce powers of the national government
as unlimited as the fashionable conception would today represent
them as being. 3 9
It is not unlikely that among the principal legislative and constitutional issues of the next ten years will be the issues surrounding
the power of the federal government to extend its role in the maintenance of public order and enforcement of the criminal law. This
review adequately exposes the present writer's conviction that the
maintenance of restrictions upon this role and the correlative avoidance of excessive restrictions upon state authority which would
vitiate its effectiveness are essential functions of the federal judiciaryfunctions vital to the maintenance of liberty and to the avoidance of
creation of institutions uncontrollable by any democratic process. The
present work, as has been noted, chronicles an increasing realization
that the federal courts have been a good deal more lax in recent years
in imposing necessary restrictions upon activities of federal officials
and the national government, the limitation of which was originally
conceived as their central function, than in vigorously confining the
authority of state officers. It is fair to predict that recent developments
will lead to an adjustment of this balance through increasing rejection
13 8 Statement to the Columbia Oral History Project, quoted in Kurland,
Robert H. Jackson, in 4 THE JusciEs oF Tirm SuPPEmE CouNT 1789-1969 at 2543,
2565 (L. Friedman and F. Israel eds. 1970).
139 United States v. Denmark, 346 U.S. 441, 447 (1953) (Jackson and Frankfurter, JJ., joining); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944)
(Black, J. dissenting); Schecter Corp. v. United States, 294 U.S. 495, 554 (19352
Cardozo and Stone, JJ. concurring); Bass v. United States, 434 F.2d 1296 (2d
Cir. 1970) (Hays and Friendly, JJ., joining the opinion); Schecter Corp. v. United
States, 76 F.2d 617, 624 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, J.). Cf. Louisville Joint Stock
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 586-89 (1985) (Brandeis, J.).
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of the naive view that in the long run "democratic participation and
individual liberty... have been threatened less by expanding federal
power than by small unpoliced concentrations of power." 140 Local
abuses are subject to national correction. Checldng the abuses of
national bureaucracies is, however, a more difficult matter. 141 The
present work affords the new generation of lawyers and law students
valuable aid in the fulfillment of this central obligation of their profession, and notation of its omissions is not intended to imply lack of
gratitude for the great services it has afforded and will continue to
afford.
George W. Liebmann*
140 Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YArE L.J. 1007,
1029 (1966).
141J. MILL, UTmrrzAvmms, LiBERTY, AND REPRESENTATnvm GovmairmNrr
224-26 (Everyman ed. 1950). The authors might have, but do not, note the rapid
expansion in the last five years of federal activities and assertions of authority of
a policing nature. See ATrom;EY GEsmtAsis FrST ANNuAL REPoRT, FEnmi..
LAW ENFOaCEMENT .AND CRuNAL JusTCE AsSISTANcE Acrvrrrms 1972, at 139
(creation in January, 1971, of "special operations group" of 114 United States
Marshals with a nationwide response time of 6 hours), at 285 (creation in 1970
of a Consolidated Federal Law Enforcement Training Center), at 139 (creation
by the General Services Administration of "specially trained and equipped mobile
cadres", with an authorized strength of 160 men, to be available on immediate
notice to cope with civil disorders), at 537 (creation in November, 1970, of a
Court Protection Program with 428 guards and a Major Facilities Program with
989 guards as a Postal Service Security Force with a unified training program), at
249 creation of an Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on March
11, 1971, under the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security
Division), at 136 (assertion of an "inherent legal right of the United States Government-a sovereign national entity under the Federal Constitution-to insure
the maintenance of public order and the carryin, out of governmental operations
within its territorial limits, by force if necessary' even in the absence of danger
to federal property or functions or a request from a Governor or State Legislature).
* Member of the Maryland Bar; Partner, Frank, Bernstein, Conoway and
Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland.

